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Abstract 
 
Genomic data provides clinical researchers with 
vast opportunities to study various patient ailments. 
Yet the same data contains revealing information, 
some of which a patient might want to remain 
concealed. The question then arises: how can an 
entity transact in full DNA data while concealing 
certain sensitive pieces of information in the genome 
sequence, and maintain DNA data utility? As a 
response to this question, we propose a codon 
frequency obfuscation heuristic, in which a 
redistribution of codon frequency values with highly 
expressed genes is done in the same amino acid 
group, generating an obfuscated DNA sequence. Our 
preliminary results show that it might be possible to 
publish an obfuscated DNA sequence with a desired 
level of similarity (utility) to the original DNA 
sequence. 
 
Keywords: Genomics data privacy; DNA 
obfuscation; Codon frequency table; Data privacy 
modeling.   
 
1. Introduction 
 
Genomic data grants clinical researchers with 
considerable prospects to study various patient 
sicknesses. Nevertheless, genomic data includes a lot 
of revealing information, some of which a patient 
might want to remain concealed. The question from 
such a patient controlled data retrieval scenario 
becomes: how can an entity transact in full DNA 
sequence data while concealing certain sensitive 
pieces of information in the genome sequence, and 
yet maintaining DNA data utility (usability)? In this 
paper, we respond to this question by putting forward 
a heuristic in which the patients might have a say as 
to what part of their genomic information they wish 
to remain concealed. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows. In Section 2, a background 
definition of bioinformatics and data privacy terms 
used in this paper is given. In Section 3, a review of 
related work on the subject of DNA privacy is done. 
In Section 4, the proposed heuristic and methodology 
is outlined in detail. In Section 5, the experiment and 
results are discussed, and lastly in Section 6, the 
conclusion and future works is given. 
 
2. Background 
 
DNA stands for deoxyribonucleic acid, a chemical 
substance that comprises functionality information 
for the make-up and growth of an organism [1]. DNA 
organization is an organized collection of four 
building blocks called nucleotides bases, namely 
adenine (A), thymine (T), guanine (G), and cytosine 
(C), in which the adenine (A) pairs with the thymine 
(T), and guanine (G) with cytosine(C); forming a 
twisted ladder-like shaped strand, referred to as a 
double helix [2]. Genomics is the study of the 
genome (DNA) sequence structure, the chemical 
components that make up the DNA structure, 
including the chemical elements that hold DNA 
components together [3]. DNA sequencing refers to 
the process of mapping out the nucleotide sequence 
of DNA [4]. Codon is a sequence of three subsequent 
nucleotides in the genome that map to a specific 
amino acid in a protein; a codon could also represent 
a triplet, which is the start and stop points in the 
DNA sequence [5]. Codon frequency table or codon 
usage table is the statistical representation of each 
codon existence in the DNA sequence [6].  
 
 
Figure 1: Google Scholar search results for “DNA Privacy” 
 
Data obfuscation  is a data privacy technique in 
which data is distorted, made imprecise,  and 
indistinguishable so as to conceal information [7]. 
Data shuffling is a data privacy technique first 
proposed by Dalenius and Reiss (1978) as a data 
swapping methodology for categorical data [8], and 
later extended by Muralidhar and Sarathy (2003) for 
numerical data;  shuffling is a data privacy procedure 
in which sensitive data values       , within an 
attribute    are exchanged between tuples         in 
the same attribute   ; for instance, a sensitive value 
    belonging to tuple     is assigned to tuple    and 
the value     belonging to tuple     is assigned to 
tuple     in the same attribute    [9].   
 
3. Related work 
 
In this section, we take a look at some work being 
done in the Genomics data privacy domain. Research 
in Genomics data privacy is relatively still in the 
early stages and not so much work and literature 
exists on the subject. For instance, as illustrated in 
Figure 1., a Google Scholar search results only 
returned 24 documents related to the “DNA Privacy” 
search term for 2013 compared to 12,700 related 
documents to the search term “Data Privacy”, for 
2013[10]. However, Genomic data privacy 
researchers have largely focused on using 
cryptographic techniques in granting confidentiality 
to DNA data sets. Malin and Sweeney (2004), 
proposed employing re-identification techniques in 
evaluating and modeling of anonymity protection 
systems for genomic data; the goal was to prevent 
any information leakage between genomic data and 
named individuals in public records [11]. Malin and 
Sweeney (2004)’s model focused on engineering a 
secure and confidential data privacy transaction 
model for genomics, without perturbing the DNA 
sequence structure. However, Malin (2005), proposed 
one of the first genomic data privacy models that 
involved the actual manipulation of the DNA 
sequence to enhance confidentiality. Malin (2005)’s 
model employed k-anonymity with generalization by 
ensuring that in a collection of DNA sequence data, 
each generalized DNA record would appear at least k 
> 1 times, to satisfy k-anonymity requirements [12]. 
Additionally, Malin (2005), provided a holistic 
evaluation of the current state of genomic data 
privacy storage and transaction systems then, by 
outlining the short comings and providing 
recommendations [13]. In this paper, we take a 
similar approach by proposing a genomic data 
privacy solution that takes into consideration both the 
bio-bank architecture and the confidential transaction 
of the individual’s DNA sequence. Other works have 
centered on employing genomics as a tools for 
cryptography [14][15]. For instance Heider and 
Barnekow (2007), proposed using DNA 
cryptographic and steganographic algorithms for 
watermarks to detect any unauthorized use of 
genetically modified organisms protected by patents 
[16]. Additionally, Kantarcioglu, Jiang, Liu, and 
Malin (2008) proposed a cryptographic model in 
which aggregated data mining, such as, frequency 
counts, could be done securely on genomic sequences 
without revealing the original encrypted raw DNA 
sequence [17]. On the other hand, El Emam (2011), 
in a review of de-identification technics for genomics 
data, observed that electronic records are increasingly 
being linked to DNA bio-banks, used by clinicians 
for genomic research, and that challenges and risks 
still remained despite de-identification techniques for 
confidentiality [15]. In this paper, we argue for a 
holistic approach that considers privacy modeling at 
both the bio-bank storage level and the data 
transaction level between the patient, doctor, and 
clinical researchers. Ayday, Raisaro, and Hubaux 
(2013) proposed a holistic model for genomics 
confidentiality in which data privacy enhancing 
principles, using homomorphic encryption,  were 
employed in modeling a secure bio-bank system, 
DNA data transaction process, and the confidentiality 
of the DNA sequence [18]. Furthermore, Ayday, 
Raisaro, Hengartner, Molyneaux, and Hubaux (2014) 
proposed a privacy preserving system to grant 
confidentiality using encryption on short reads of raw 
genomic data [19]. In their model, Ayday et 
al.,(2014),  suggested storing short reads in encrypted 
form at a bio-bank  and then allow the stakeholders to 
securely retrieve only needed short reads [19].  
 
 
Figure 2: Overview of the bio-bank and DNA transaction model 
 
From a bio-bank architectural privacy modeling 
view, we follow a similar approach to Ayday et al., 
(2014) by proposing the encryption of all medical 
records, including genomic data at the bio-bank level. 
However, in our model, the full perturbed raw DNA 
sequence, in which sensitive genomic information is 
either suppressed or altered, is retrieved. In our 
model, the privatized DNA sequences are retrieved 
by controlling the number of queries to prevent 
information leakages. For instance, a clinical 
researcher in hospital A, might be interested only in a 
set of genes responsible for cancer, while another 
researcher at hospital B, might be interested in genes 
linked to diabetes. In such scenarios, information 
leaked from hospitals A and B could be used to 
reconstruct sensitive information in the DNA 
sequence of a patient.  Another way to get around the 
issue of information leakage, we propose a 
publication of static tabulated results for non-
interactive settings. In this scenario, our model would 
only publish or transact in pre-defined results that 
could not be changeable, after the initial obfuscation. 
In this case, patients would publish the same 
privatized DNA sequence to all parties involved. This 
would be useful when dealing with entities such as, 
insurance companies and clinical researchers, only 
interested in aggregated statistical analysis.  
 
4. Methodology 
 
In this section we present the proposed 
methodology on the obfuscation of codons with 
highly expressed genes, for privacy. In this paper we 
assume that the DNA data transaction will occur 
between the patient, data curator (bio-bank), and a 
clinical researcher. The goal is to obfuscate the DNA 
data so that the clinical researchers will not view any 
gene information deemed sensitive by the patient. In 
other words, the patient controls by authorization, 
what they wish to be disclosed. Our proposed 
architecture, as illustrated in Figure 2, is composed of 
three components, the main original data storage 
component, the obfuscated data component, and the 
patient record component. The main original data 
storage component (Bio-bank): This acts as a main 
storage for the patient medical records storage, 
including the DNA data. The original data storage 
component is highly restricted and all records are 
encrypted. Access to this data storage is enforced by 
documentation of who gained access, what time they 
gained access, how long they accessed the system, 
what information they access, and what time they 
exited the storage system. In this controlled 
environment, access to the storage requires another 
signatory for accountability. In other words, the 
system will not allow one individual to access the 
system without accountability from another official.  
The obfuscation data processing component: This 
component, as illustrated in Figure 3, acts as a 
privacy layer between the patient record access 
component and the main original data storage 
component. Data generation in the obfuscated data 
storage is done by controlled query access on the 
main original data storage component. The number 
and type of queries run on the system is strictly 
limited to prevent information leakage. Obfuscation 
procedures are then applied to the results that are 
generated by the query. The only records stored or 
accessed in the obfuscated data storage component, 
are those that have been sanitized (privatized) via 
obfuscation and other data privacy algorithms. 
 
 
Figure 3: The obfuscated data processing component 
 
Access to the obfuscated data component and 
querying process is strictly enforced using the same 
security access control methods, as applied to the 
original data storage component. Any data 
transaction, will only involve access to the 
Obfuscated data storage unit. This component is 
responsible for generating obfuscated patient records 
needed for any data transaction. The patient record 
component: In this component, the patient and or 
clinical researcher have access to the obfuscated 
medical and DNA record. The patient can authorize 
time restricted access to this record to their physician 
or a clinical researcher. The patient record 
component will document each access by a doctor, 
clinician, or the patient themselves. The patient 
record component could be accessible using mobile 
devices, via secure and encrypted connectivity. 
Phase I: In the first phase of the obfuscation, as 
illustrated in Figure 3, Personal Identifiable 
Information (PII) is removed from the data set. After 
PII is removed, data shuffling is applied to the de-
identified data set to increase obfuscation. In our 
methodology, partial data shuffling is applied on the 
data set. All attributes undergo data shuffling with 
exception of the Patient ID and DNA attributes. The 
reason for the data shuffling is that if the controlled 
and restricted data falls in the hands of an attacker, it 
would be difficult to reconstruct the full identify of a 
patient. Yet still, this would prevent inside attacks by 
those who have minimal access to the data system at 
various technical support levels. In our methodology, 
data shuffling is based on a random number 
generator. The rows of data values (tuples) in each 
attribute are aligned to a sequence of randomly 
generated numbers, which then get sorted. The seed 
for the random number generator is kept secret by the 
data curators (Bio-bank), to make it difficult for any 
reverse engineering. In this model, each attributed is 
shuffled vertically, separately, and finally, all 
attributes are combined to generate the complete 
partially shuffled data set. 
 
 
Figure 4: DNA data obfuscation overview 
 
Phase II: In phase II, data obfuscation is done on 
the DNA sequence, by perturbation of the codon 
frequency table, as illustrated in Figure 4. In the first 
step, a codon frequency table is generated for each of 
the DNA sequence in the database. A frequency 
analysis is then done to highlight the most frequent 
codons in the table – that is, codons with the most 
highly expressed genes in each amino acid group. 
Perturbation by redistribution is done within the same 
amino acid group. Perturbation is done on codons 
with high frequency values – by redistributing the 
frequencies among the codon values in the same 
amino acid group. In this way, the same amino acid 
could remain ‘highly expressed’ while giving a form 
of obfuscation to the highly expressed genes in the 
codon.  
  
Table 1, Codon frequency for Asp before obfuscation 
Asp GAT 1 
Asp GAC 5 
 
For example, the codon GAC has a high frequency 
value in the aspartic (Asp) amino acid group, with a 
frequency of 5 while GAT appears only once. The 
total frequency for the Asp amino acid group is then 
6, as shown in Tables 1. 
After perturbation by redistribution of the codon 
frequencies, the GAC codon gets a frequency value 
of 3 while the GAT codon, a frequency value of 3. 
However, the total frequency value for the Asp amino 
acid group remains intact, at 6, as show in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Codon frequency for Asp after obfuscation 
Asp GAT 3 
Asp GAC 3 
 
The totals of all codons in the frequency table stay 
the same; at this stage, the DNA sequence base pair 
size stays intact and the same as the original. After 
perturbation by redistribution of the codon 
frequencies, the new generated frequency table 
(privatized table) is then used to generate a new 
privatized DNA sequence. A pairwise alignment to 
compare the original DNA sequence to the privatized 
DNA sequence is done. Similarity values are used to 
determine if an acceptable threshold value is 
achieved. For example, a 50 percent similarity value 
might be acceptable as threshold; if this threshold 
value is not met, then a refinement is done by re-
doing the redistribution of frequency values in the 
codon table. The last step is to publish the privatized 
DNA sequence without revealing data from highly 
expressed genes in codons with high frequencies. The 
original codon frequency values are kept encrypted at 
the main bio-bank storage. Therefore, this procedure 
could be applicable by implementing the extra layer 
of confidentiality for the patient DNA sequence 
during data transaction from one point to another. 
 
5. Experiment and Results 
 
Experiment, Phase I: To test our hypothesis, we 
generated a synthetic patient records data set with 
150 data points containing PII information, medical 
records, and the DNA sequence of each patient.  
 
 
Figure 5: The random number generator seed used for shuffling 
 
The synthetic patient records data set was used to 
simulate the real original patient records data set. The 
synthetic patient records included the following set of 
attributes: {Patient ID, First Name, Last Name, 
Gender, SSN, DOB, Address, City, State, Zip code, 
Country, Diagnosis Code, Diagnosis Description, 
PCP, and DNA}. During the first phase of the 
obfuscation, the following attributes were removed 
from the data set to satisfy PII sanitization 
requirements: {First Name, Last Name, SSN, 
Address, and City}. Data shuffling was then 
individually applied to each of the following 
remaining attributes: {Patient ID, Gender, DOB, 
State, Zip code, Country, Diagnosis Code, Diagnosis 
Description, PCP, and DNA}.  
 
 
Figure 6: Values in red show the change in position after shuffling 
 
A random number generator was used in shuffling 
the values in each separate attribute. The values were 
mapped to the randomly generated numbers between 
a chosen seed, in the case of our experiment, the seed 
was chosen as real numbers between 0 and 1. After 
the mapping the values in the attributes to the random 
numbers, sorting was done. The values in the 
attributes changed positions with each sorting 
iteration, thus shuffling, as illustrated in Figure 6. 
Figure 6, shows an illustration of a returned query 
results showing the effects of shuffling on the 
attribute values. The highlighted figures in red in 
Figure 6, show the shift in each of the shuffled values 
from their original positions.  
 
 
Figure 7: Shuffling results for the date of birth attribute. 
 
It would be difficult for an attacker to reverse 
engineer the process to gain the original row of data 
without prior knowledge, and considering that the 
database would contain millions of data points. To 
ensure that the data values in each attribute were 
efficiently shuffled, we did a frequency distribution 
analysis on the date of birth attribute, before and after 
shuffling. As illustrated in Figures 7, the date of birth 
for Patient ID P000001 was 1934 before shuffling. 
However as illustrated in Figure 7, the date of birth 
for the same Patient ID P000001 was substituted with 
1979 after shuffling, thus offering a layer of 
confidentiality for Patient ID P000001.   
Experiment, Phase II: To further test our 
hypothesis, we generated synthetic DNA sequences 
for each of the Patient ID records in that database. 
For the remainder of this paper and context of this 
experiment, we shall refer to both the synthetic DNA 
sequence and synthetic patient records, as original 
data. Each generated original DNA sequence 
contained 500 base pairs. The FASTA format was 
used in formatting the raw generated original DNA 
sequence. 150 original DNA sequences were 
generated for the original patient database.  In the 
next step of the Phase II experiment, the codon 
frequency of the generated original DNA sequence 
was done. Codon frequency obfuscation was 
achieved by redistributing values of codons with 
highly expressed genes, within the same amino acid 
group. For instance as illustrated in Figure 8, the 
codon values for CAG and CAA in the Glutamine 
(Gln) amino acid group was 2 and 9 respectively. In 
the obfuscation process, the codon values for CAG 
and CAA were reassigned to 5 and 6 respectively, 
after redistribution.  
 
 
Figure 8: Codon frequencies before and after obfuscation. 
 
It is important to note that while the codon values 
for CAG and CAA were altered, the totals for the 
frequency of that particular amino acid, in this case 
Glutamine (Gln), remained the same at 11. In other 
words, perturbation was done to the frequency values 
of the codons themselves but not the frequency 
values of the amino acid group. As shown in Figure 
9, the frequency of the Glutamine amino acid in the 
original DNA sequence is 11, and after obfuscation, 
the frequency value for the same amino acid stays the 
same at 11. The obfuscated codon table was then 
used to generate the obfuscated DNA sequence. A 
pairwise comparison was then done on both the 
original and obfuscated DNA sequences. A pairwise 
analysis was done on both the original and 
obfuscated DNA sequence. The goal was to 
implement an obfuscation of codons with highly 
expressed genes in the DNA sequence. The question 
of data privacy versus usability still affects the 
outcome of the results. Too much obfuscation may 
alter the DNA sequence with many mutations; 
minimal obfuscation could also be revealing. 
 
 
Figure 9: Amino acid frequencies before and after obfuscation. 
 
In the first part of our pairwise analysis, we 
compared the original protein sequence to the 
obfuscated protein sequence. Tables 3 and 4 show the 
protein sequences we used for the pairwise analysis 
for both the original and obfuscated data. 
 
Table 3: Original protein sequence 
>EMBOSS_001_1 
QDSSGLEVAPAKEDAWYSRTMKPVQRQHP
HLGEPKRGIKVTFWIPETNPMVVLRLGSLSP 
LGPISGNRRQVQSVFRRTMEQCG*DVLHL
YPTQAGPRSARRGGAQAIDN*PPCIHYGTRD 
FKPSQWSSQYRVYRILP*LTNCDPPQVKPLP
LRHAVRVIM*TLRGLT 
 
Sequence Translation tool: 
http://www.ebi.ac.uk/Tools/st/ 
 
Table 4: Obfuscated protein sequence  
>EMBOSS_001_1 
RDAQSVPGSSTVERVLGTHDTADDVIYRT
SHLASLGRRDQYSTNEPNSSRPRSLPRTGAA 
EPLLGGLQPRHYSRHPLRHGAWRKAGRNY
KRNAQVVAFNQLSLSVRSSQPFKLSRHST*Q 
LFASGTGLSD*WQPHVLL*LP**LPGPH*L
GSRYRHGPCFNNQIF  
 
Sequence Translation tool : 
http://www.ebi.ac.uk/Tools/st/   
 
As shown in Figure 10 and 11, the pairwise 
alignment analysis for both the original and 
obfuscated protein sequence, generated only 18 
percent similarity [20]. While this might be a good 
indication of privacy and obfuscation, questions 
remain as to the viability of DNA data utility. The dot 
matrix in Figure 11 shows regions of similarity 
between the original and obfuscated protein 
sequences. The x-axis represents the obfuscated 
protein sequence while the y-axis shows the original 
protein sequence. A diagonal line in the matrix would 
represent an ideal perfect match for similarity. The 
nonaligned lines represent the mismatch between the 
two protein sequences. 
 
 
Figure 10: The pairwise alignment between original and 
obfuscated protein sequences. 
 
 
Figure 11: The original and obfuscated protein sequence dot 
matrix.  
 
We then used the protein sequence of the original 
DNA sequence to act as a key and reverse engineered 
the obfuscated DNA sequence to obtain the original 
DNA sequence by reverse translation.  
 
 
Figure 12: The original and obfuscated DNA sequence dot matrix, 
after reverse translation. 
 
We used the codon frequency table of the obfuscated 
DNA sequence to generate the original DNA 
sequence, using the protein sequence of the original 
DNA sequence as key. The dot matrix in Figure 12 
shows regions of similarity between the original and 
obfuscated DNA sequences after the reverse 
engineering process. The x-axis represents the 
obfuscated DNA sequence while the y-axis shows the 
original DNA sequence. A diagonal line in the matrix 
would represent an ideal perfect match or similarity. 
The nonaligned lines represent the mismatch between 
the two DNA sequences. As shown in Figure 12 and 
13, there was a 78 percent similarity between the 
original and obfuscated DNA sequences after the 
reverse engineering process.  
 
 
Figure 13: The dissimilarities between the original and obfuscated 
DNA sequences after reverse translation.  
 
While the focus of this paper was not to study 
various reverse engineering attacks, our results show 
that when the protein sequence of the original data 
was used in combination with the codon frequency 
table of the obfuscated DNA data, to reserve 
translate, there was only a 78 percent success rate.  
 
 
Figure 14: The original and obfuscated DNA sequence dot matrix. 
 
The results could as well mean that this heuristic 
was good for privacy, with 22 percent of the data 
remaining concealed – relating to the obfuscation 
done only on codons with high frequencies and 
highly expressed genes. In Figure 13, the highlighted 
obfuscated DNA sequence in red, represent the 
dissimilarities between the original and obfuscated 
DNA sequences after the reverse translation process.  
The dot matrix in Figure 14 shows regions of 
similarity between the original and obfuscated DNA 
sequences. The x-axis represents the obfuscated DNA 
sequence while the y-axis shows the original DNA 
sequence. A diagonal line in the matrix would 
correspond to a perfect similarity. The nonaligned 
lines represent the mismatch between the two DNA 
sequences. The results in Figure 14 and 15 show the 
pairwise alignment between the original DNA 
sequence and the obfuscated DNA sequence 
generated from the perturbed codon frequency table 
without any the reverse engineering process. The 
results show that there was a 50 percent similarity, 
indicating that privacy might be achieved by the 
concealment provided by the other 50 percent 
dissimilarity; yet again, the issue of privacy versus 
usability resurfaces.  
 
 
Figure 15: The dissimilarities between the original and obfuscated 
DNA sequences.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
We have presented a codon frequency obfuscation 
heuristic for genomic data privacy. DNA data privacy 
in general, remains a challenge. However, data 
usability remains a challenge with DNA obfuscation 
– more mutations in obfuscated data. Our proposed 
model shows that it might be possible to perturb the 
codon frequency table by redistributing codon 
frequencies of highly expressed genes within the 
same amino acid group for confidentiality. Our 
preliminary results show that even with reverse 
engineering using the obfuscated DNA codon 
frequency table in combination with the protein 
sequence of the original DNA sequence, only 78 
percent was recoverable, indicating that it might be 
possible to conceal certain sections of information 
within the DNA sequence. In this proposed heuristic, 
we envision a well informed patient with full rights 
and authorization as to what information within the 
DNA sequence they might want to remain concealed. 
While the focus in this paper was to present 
preliminary results from the testing of the hypothesis, 
future works will include testing the model against 
various reverse engineering attacks. For future works 
include, running the same tests using real DNA data 
from living organism with large base pairs (big data).  
We plan on employing other data privacy algorithms 
not covered in this paper; developing a prototype of 
the obfuscation architecture to automate the proposed 
heuristic. 
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